Week 6: Biosecurity

Resources

Podcast for the week: Alison Young on how top labs have jeopardized public health with repeated biosafety failures (~2 hours)

Background reading

Info hazard guidance for biosecurity discussions [BlueDot - Shared] (10-20 minutes)

Info Hazards

  • Generating or spreading information hazards related to biological risks can cause harm

    • The historical record shows that state and non-state actors have pursued the capability to cause large-scale harm with biology, and likely continue to do so.

      • According to an email sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri to a compatriot in 1999, al-Qaeda only became aware of and began pursuing biological weapons when “the enemy drew [al-Qaeda’s] attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply.”

      • While uncovering and sharing vulnerabilities in our biosecurity infrastructure (e.g., existing medical countermeasures, detection systems) can galvanize efforts to fix them, it can also lead bad actors to take advantage of them. For example, we’re uncertain whether this disclosure about DNA synthesis screening was net-positive (probably yes).

  • The costs of discussing biological threat models will often be larger than the benefits.

    • Imagine there exists a novel bioweapon design that represents 5% of catastrophic biorisk over the next 30 years

      • Assuming risk increases linearly with exposure time, this could add 2.5 percentage points to the total 30-year risk of a global biological catastrophe

    • Potential benefits of learning about info hazards

      • Some threats could be very difficult to block.

      • Knowing about specific threats wouldn’t necessarily change our priorities.

  • It’s sometimes difficult to know when discussing GCBRs will be net-positive.

    • It’s plausible that smart, security-minded researchers who sounded the alarm about nuclear weapons in the 1940s accelerated the nuclear arms race in a harmful way

    • Vast majority of the brainstorming of GCBR-relevant info hazards is coming from well-intentioned discussion groups such as those in this course

Recommendations

  1. Avoid brainstorming novel ways to cause harm with biology.

    1. In particular, don’t create an environment where everyone is sitting around trying to figure out how to kill people with biotechnology.

  2. Ground discussions of threats in well-known historical examples where you can.

    1. Beyond historical examples, if it helps frame the conversation, we think one could also pretty safely consider the following threat, without speculating about the underlying biological details

  3. Focus on broad-spectrum interventions with limited downsides.

    1. e.g., building metagenomic detection systems to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

  4. Consult others before taking actions towards reducing GCBRs.

    1. Be an agent, not a unilateralist.

    2. e.g., such as publishing a blog post or launching a hackathon.

  5. Intervene kindly if discussions veer towards info hazards.

    1. We all make mistakes, there is a lot of uncertainty here, and we need each other’s support

  6. Use available resources, including reaching out for help.

Concrete examples that seem safe to talk about

  • Generally

    • pretty safe to discuss things that are already well known

  • Terrorists with the capability could in principle release multiple pandemic pathogens at once, and this is one respect in which deliberate attack scenarios may differ from natural spillover scenarios in some ways (though probably not in other ways)

  • The lethal dose of botulinum toxin

  • The documented mechanisms of action of various antibiotics, antifungals, and antivirals

  • This notable paper, one of two that sparked the 2012 “gain of function” research debate

  • This (in)famous paper about synthesizing the extinct horsepox virus

  • The researchers who inadvertently developed a mousepox virus which evaded immunity

  • The recent example of an AI drug discovery model being used to identify potentially lethal toxins

  • The general idea that you could in theory make a biological weapon that targets a specific person or group of people, e.g., using some sort of DNA-recognizing system like CRISPT

    • Specific mechanisms that could do this would be an info hazard

  • The fact that not all providers of synthesized DNA adequately screen their orders for dangerous DNA or malevolent customers , inc. the fact that journalists were able to order viral genome fragments in 2006

    • A list of specific companies that fail to screen their orders would be an info hazard

  • The list of organisms that were developed as weapons by 20th century biological weapons programs, and the federal US list of select agents and toxins

  • Items on the Australia Group’s export control lists

  • The fact that the genome of the variola virus (which causes smallpox) is freely available online

  • The fact that accidental releases of select agents from labs are fairly common

  • Kevin Esvelt’s work on gene drive technology and countermeasures

  • Current capabilities of LLMs for providing information on how to develop classic biological weapons agents, e.g., anthrax, including publicly-disclosed methods for measuring those capabilities

    • Information related to LLMs’ ability to generate ideas for novel biological weapons could, however, pose info hazards

How will we motivate people to defend against specific threats if no one talks about them?

  • In some circumstances, in order to motivate defensive work, intentionally disclosing specific threats to select people will be the right thing to do.

  • The case for engaging with info hazards changes when somebody is in a strong position to use that information effectively and responsibly to reduce biological risk

  • But figuring out whether to do so is a decision that really should not be taken lightly, and it’s unlikely a reading or discussion group is the right venue for this.

Pandemic prevention as fire-fighting (30 minutes)

Solvability

  • Fire

    • Almost disappeared as a cause of death in the developed world.

      • This might be possible for infectious diseases

  • Pandemic

    • Smallpox remains to this day only one of two infectious diseases to have been intentionally eradicated from nature

    • Smallpox was 'easy' to eradicate

      • No animal reservoir

      • Symptoms were distinctive, with no asymptomatic transmission.

      • Genome is made of DNA, which means it has a much slower mutation rate than many other viruses.

Strategies to Mitigate Risks

  • Prevention

    • Fire

      • Number one cause of fire is human behavior e.g., cooking

    • Pandemic

    • Accidental Leak

  • Detection

    • Fire

      • Fire alarms

        • halves risk of fire death

        • reduces risk of a fire spreading beyond room of origin by 71%

    • Pandemic

      • Infections may double every 2.5 days

        • Day 1 = 1 infection / day

        • Day 60 = million infections / day

      • Global Alarm system

        • Detection Tests

          • Specific to genome (if we know what we are looking for)

            • e.g., COVID PCR Test

            • e.g., Poliovirus is being found in wastewater across the world using PCR techniques

          • Universal to all genomes (if we don't know what we are looking for)

  • Passive Protection

    • Fire

      • Automatic sprinkler systems

      • Firefighters

      • Urban environment engineered around preventing the spread of fire

        • e.g., Fire hydrants

      • Regulations of building materials

    • Pandemic

      • Ventilation & Filters removing virus from indoor air

      • UVC light

      • PPE

  • Active Protection

    • Vaccine Development

      • For around half of the virus families that infect humans, we do not have a licensed vaccine for any virus within the family.

      • Accelerate the development & authorization timeline

    • Free, fast, and secure screening of synthetic DNA orders.

  • Sources of change

    • Innovators, engineers, campaigners, regulators, legislators

Proliferation

  • Governments seeking pandemic power

    • States generally have the capacity to do things when they decide it is in their interest.

      • e.g., North Korea developing nuclear bomb

    • Signatory of the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) = Not Assured

    • Individuals/Smaller groups can access pandemic power too

      • People in the world who could be capable of assembling an influenza virus based on publicly available genetic sequences number in the tens of thousands.

        • In an act that might plausibly have caused more harm than good, researchers proved that they could reconstitute horsepox – an extinct virus similar to smallpox – for a mere $100,000.

Personal Reflections

  • Change biology of sentience (e.g., human species) so they are not affected by virus anymore i.e., mind-upload, robotic body, DNA-change

  • Emphasise 'foundational societal work' towards robots i.e., not affected by pandemics

    • e.g., food production, energy production is maintained during a pandemic

  • Acceleration of Vaccines and Safety Concerns

    • What data is available that shows that safety is maintained / strengthened while accelerating the vaccine development?

  • Western Bias

    • The article mentioned the Soviet Union as being a factor for bio-risk while not mentioning that the USA is continuing 'defensive' bio-weapon research while refusing to allow BWC verification measures

The Biological Weapons Convention: Challenges and Opportunities (15 minutes)

Solvability

  • Hindrances

    • Geopolitical challenges weakens international arms control & disarmament efforts

    • Doubt

      • Several states have made allegations related to biological weapons programmes

  • Facilitators

    • Tools

      • Confidence-building measures (CBMs), transparency, compliance and verification, and the national implementation of the BWC

    • Policy

      • Defining Biological Weapons based on 'intent' of use

        • 'microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes'

      • Create Conceptual Clarity of a shared vision for Verification

        • What such a mechanism would seek to do and what it would not do

      • Developing mechanisms to review developments in science and technology

      • Developing a mechanism to promote international cooperation

        • Uneven distribution of the benefits of biotechnology

        • Without cooperation, other developments will be hindered

      • Ensuring a division of labour between the national and international levels

        • a division of labour is required between international activities and those undertaken domestically to implement the BWC and wider obligations

      • Building institutional support

    • National Implementation of the BWC

      • Guidance on biosafety and biosecurity

      • Wider governance measures such as codes of conduct and educational materials designed to inform scientists of their legal and normative responsibilities

    • Verification

      • Status

        • 'Despite several years of negotiations among states over the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the protocol did not come to fruition and was rejected in 2001 largely due to US objections.'

        • First mentioned again at a BWC conference after 20 years

      • How?

        • satellites to bio forensics or open-source intelligence

    • Building transparency

      • CBMs are the primary agreed source of transparency in the BWC

        • “to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions, and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities”.

      • Status

        • Just over 50% of states parties have exchanged CBMs in the last few years

Importance

  • Terrorist Uses

    • e.g., Aum Shinrikyo, Japan

  • Use cases

    • Mass killings, assassination

    • sabotage; small-scale, deniable, localised attacks against a particular population group designed to kill, incapacitate, demoralise, or degrade such a segment of the population.

Personal Notes

  • Learning how to achieve increased cooperation would be universally helpful for many other moral aspects e.g., x-risks

  • What are the key hindrances to verification? Who?

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